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—Unbelievable, Shakespeare, if I’m perfectly frank.1 We were up in
Stratford, a few moons ago now it was, saw Henry IV the so-called
Part 1 one night, the so-called Part 2 the next. First days of August
2007 if I recall aright, the Avon still very high after the flooding from
the previous couple of weeks, afternoon of the second day it absolutely
tipped down, we parked just outside the church and waited for it to
subside a bit. Great puddles, splashing our way down the tree-lined
churchyard path as the sunshine started breaking through. Two pounds
now, can you credit it, used to cost nothing, give it time and it’ll be
a thousand, to get access to the chancel and set eyes on the family
gathering, William and widow and all, and the bust to the left of the
altar, put up in her lifetime, as the bumph stresses. ‘Good friend for
Jesus sake forbeare, / To dig the dust enclosed here. / Blessed be the
man that spares these stones, / And cursed be he that moves my bones.’
Unbelievable. You were there.
—Me? Where?
—You were standing on the right side, close to the 1605 Geneva Bible
they have on display, the one from which he would have heard readings
during his visits to church in the last few years of his life, as the bumph
stresses. There’s a door, to the right, in front of the altar, and sunlight
was streaming in through a gap. A single padlock securing the thing.
And you were thinking, God knows why, but people do, about what
would be required in order to break in at night, lift the stone (it’s not
clear why it says ‘stones’, except for the rhyme, there’s just the one slab,
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isn’t there, but I suppose he wasn’t to know), dig the dust and get some
DNA—the deserts, the forests, the gypsies—
—You’re mental, you are.
—We’re both mental, you fool. Personally I was struck by the
prosopopoeia, the voice-from-beyond-the-grave, the way I was being
addressed as ‘dear friend’. Shakespeare’s a miracle.
—What do you mean? What is a miracle? And when? You remind me
of something the bizarre narrator of Henry James’s The Sacred Fount
comes out with: ‘I don’t insist on the name. Nothing is, I admit, a
miracle from the moment one’s on the track of the cause, which was
the scent we were following. Call the thing simply my fact.’2
—Your fact? Is that with an ‘a’ or a ‘u’?
— I want to say—
—Tush, never tell me.
— I want—
—You’re going to have to be quiet. You’ll already have annoyed
enough people as it is. You cannot write Shakespeare criticism
in or for more than one voice: it’s against all the monological,
monophonocentric rules of scholarship and academic decorum.
— I—
—No more. Never never never never never. Remember what a certain
philosopher says.
— Jesus wept. He groaned in the spirit. Anyway, who said this was
‘Shakespeare criticism’?
—Precisely apropos Shakespeare, he says: ‘There has never been a
scholar who really, and as scholar, deals with ghosts. A traditional
scholar does not believe in ghosts—nor in all that could be called the
virtual space of spectrality.’3 He is meditating on Marcellus’ plea in the
face of the Ghost— ‘Thou art a scholar, speak to it Horatio’ (1.1.42).
It’s a question of the kinds of writing, thinking and life (yes, living,
learning to live, living on) that follow the knowledge that ‘address[ing
oneself] to spirits . . . is not only possible, but . . . will have at all times
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conditioned, as such, address in general’ (SM 12). To be a philosopher
worthy of the name, in this context, is to be someone ‘mad enough to
hope to unlock [open up or unbolt: déverrouiller] the possibility of such
an address’ (12/34).
—So the voice from beyond the grave—
—I told you to shut it.
—You just told me to open up.
— Incredible, Derrida. Yes, mad enough to hope. I could imagine
someone writing at great length about hope in the work of this mad
philosopher, the madness to hope, the madness of hope, a figure that
he connects with Heidegger, for example, in the relatively early essay
‘Différance’,4 but that plays a perhaps somewhat subterranean role in
so many other texts.
—Can you just clarify— am I to infer that I am dead? . . . I see. . . Not
a mouse stirring. . . I see. . . In any case, I think first of all you need to
be concerned about the word ‘miracle’. You said it in the context of
Shakespeare: I wasn’t sure if you meant his work or his life, his having
lived, or again his epitaph, his tomb and monument at Stratford, the
force of prosopopeia, in other words his living on. It made me uneasy.
I’m not at all sure whether the word ‘miracle’ is prudent. And then
for a split-second I had the distinct feeling you were going to make a
similar pronouncement about Jacques Derrida.
—Absolutely, you must have been reading my mind. But I’ll say
it anyway, for the benefit of the audience who otherwise might not
believe it: Derrida’s a miracle.
— I find all of this quite troubling. To say that someone or—more
precisely, I suppose— someone’s writing is a miracle is surely to
subscribe to a religious and more narrowly perhaps a Christian kind
of discourse. . . .
— It depends. There is miracle and miracle. Miracle play, dear friend.
That is where we have to begin.
—Where we have to begin? That sounds like an allusion to the
mad philosopher’s answer to the question, in the form of that
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emphatic and extraordinary sentence: ‘Wherever we are: in a text already
where we believe ourselves to be [Quelque part où nous sommes:
en un texte déjà où nous croyons être].’5 Rodolphe Gasché quotes this
sentence from Of Grammatology in a recent essay on Derrida and
wonder. (Perhaps you were citing him? Or perhaps you haven’t read
it? If not, I recommend it.) Gasché considers the ways in which
wonder lies at the origin of philosophy, whether for Plato in the
Theaetetus or Aristotle in his Metaphysics.6 No philosophy without
thaumazein. And yet, as Gasché goes on to say, despite its significance
throughout the history of philosophy, up to and including the writings
of Husserl and Heidegger, ‘explicit reference to the problematic
of philosophical wonder is oddly absent from Derrida’s work’ (p.
332). Gasché suggests that one reason for this is that ‘thaumazein
as the origin of philosophical thought contains. . . the outlines of a
metaphysics of the subject, the conception of an anthropology, as
well as the elementary features of humanism’ (p. 332). The point
then, he says, is that, ‘as an integral part of the whole of philosophy,
wonder cannot. . . escape deconstructive vigilance’ (p. 337). Derrida’s
writings entail a thinking of wonder otherwise, as without single origin.
Wonder itself will have been supplemented, overtaken, surprised.
Gasché illustrates this by reference to that statement about having to
begin ‘in a text already where we believe ourselves to be’. Alluding
to Derrida’s emphasis (in the same section of Of Grammatology
[157–8 / 226–7]) on the way in which language takes us by surprise,
Gasché writes:
thinking, philosophical thinking, for example, is always necessarily
‘held within’ [prise] and ‘overtaken’ [surprise] by a language and a
logic constituting a system which cannot be dominated by thinking:
this system has always ‘sufficiently surprising resources’ to which
discourse whatever is said is always otherwise than what is intended.
The wonder that causes thinking, would thus be nothing less than an
awareness of being overtaken by the resources of that in which one is
caught. (p. 338)
Language always takes first prize. Indeed there’s no competition. As
Sarah Wood once remarked, it’s a matter of trying ‘to undo the magic
isolation of surprise as the property of somebody, or as an aesthetic
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effect which merely blinds and binds the movement of writing’.7
Gasché’s essay ‘Thinking, Without Wonder’ focuses on philosophy,
on what he calls ‘a certain irreducibility of the philosophical’ (p. 333),
and on the ways in which deconstructive thinking necessarily dislocates
the philosophical. Gasché doesn’t say anything as such about religion
or literature. It’s no wonder, you might think, he doesn’t talk about
miracle.
—Nor, if I may get a word in edgeways, would it be any wonder that
Derrida doesn’t much trouble himself to write about miracles. So far as
I am aware, the word ‘miracle’ appears only rarely in his work.
— I’m not so sure about that.8 And of course it depends also what you
mean by ‘appear’. Miracles would always have to do with some kind of
verbal apparitioning, wouldn’t they?
—Anyway, I was saying. . . The funny thing is that the word does
indeed crop up just when he is discussing that formulation, first
published in Of Grammatology in 1967, about where we have to begin,
viz ‘Wherever we are: in a text already where we believe ourselves to be
[Quelque part où nous sommes: en un texte déjà où nous croyons être].’
It’s thirty years later, in Counterpath, in some reflections addressed to
Catherine Malabou, on 25 November 1997. Derrida writes:
I wonder whether today, at the end of a long road, I wouldn’t
make the word ‘believe [croyons]’ carry the whole weight of it. In the
polysemy, indeed the homonymy of the verbs croire (believe that this
can happen, believe someone’s word, believe in someone, so many
different things, but most often possible, likely, thus credible, and
hence independent of pure belief [la pure croyance]), I would insist on
that other belief, the credence par excellence—which is possible only
by believing in the impossible. A miracle is in the realm of the ordinary
for pure belief [Le miracle serait l’ordinaire de la pure croyance]. And
the ‘text where we believe ourselves to be’, another name for this
place, place in general, interests me only where the impossible, that
is to say the incredible, encircles and harries it, making my head
turn, leaving an illegible trace within the taking-place, there, in the
vertigo, ‘where we believe ourselves to be’. . . . [sic] Place is always
unbelievable to me, as is orientation.9
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Miracle would be the ordinary of pure belief. ‘Place is always
unbelievable to me’: it’s making my head turn, it’s vertiginous. This
interest in the impossible, in the play of place and the theatre of
the impossible, is what you find, for example, in his reading of
Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet. It’s a question of how, in Shakespeare,
‘the impossible happens’.10
—Ah, Shakespeare: I was beginning to wonder . . . So what are you
saying exactly?
— I’m saying that miracle, in Derrida, has to do with writing, with
a sense of place, with an experience of the impossible in the text
wherever we are. Literature, in this context, has special significance
as the space in which the dead return, where ghosts speak, where
resurrection happens, but also where the most unbelievable things
occur, the most miraculous coincidences, miraculous recoveries and
miraculous escapes. Here, in a sense, the miraculous is the ordinary
or everyday of literature. And when ‘the impossible happens’, as
Derrida stresses in ‘Aphorism Countertime’, this has nothing to do
with ‘ “objective reality” ’ (as he calls it, in scare quotes: AC, p. 422).
It is about Shakespeare’s ‘theatre of the impossible’ (p. 422). At the
same time, however, miracle would also be, in a differently exemplary
fashion, the ordinary of deconstruction, if there is any. That’s why, in
the piece on Romeo and Juliet, Derrida goes on to declare, nevertheless,
that ‘The impossible. . . also tells the truth’ (p. 422). If miracle is
a question of text, writing or inscription, in the generalized sense
in which Derrida has elaborated these terms (a situation, such as
being in church, is a text; DNA is a text; etc), it is also about
iterability.
—Hang on, I’m losing you.
—Come back. Come to. Be astonished. Miracles today—as if
everything were absolutely new. Remember that strange verbless,
perhaps subjectless sentence in Derrida’s 1963 essay ‘Force and
Signification’: ‘Astonishment. . . by language as the origin of history
[Étonnement. . . par le langage comme origine de l’histoire].’11 OK, listen.
Here are a few prompts or stage directions regarding the miracle or
miraculous in Derrida and Shakespeare:
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1. Iterability. Discussing that aphoristic text about Romeo and Juliet,
the ‘tiny little text [un tout petit texte]’ called ‘Aphorism Countertime’,
the mad philosopher stresses that one must ‘reconstitute in the most
informed and intelligible way, if necessary against the usual history
of the historians, the historical element in a play. . . not just the
historicity of its composition by Shakespeare, its inscription in a chain
of works, etc., . . . but also what is historical in the play itself. . . .
This has to do with the structure of a text, with. . . its iterability,
which both puts down roots in the unity of a context and immediately
opens this non-saturable context onto a recontextualization. All
this is historical through and through. The iterability of the trace
(unicity, identification, and alteration in repetition) is the condition
of historicity’.12 My reading of the so-called first part of Henry IV
(I will rename it shortly) is guided by this question of iteration and
iterability.Henry IV has a unique position in the Shakespearean oeuvre
for the analytical, theatrical and poetic stress it gives to what Falstaff
calls ‘iteration’. Iterability, that strange logic that binds repetition and
alterity, is traced in Shakespeare’s ‘iteration’; but iterability, like the
trace, is not and cannot become an object of thought. Rather it entails
what Rodolphe Gasché calls ‘a non-thinkable tear within what is’
(TWW, p. 334). If Derrida’s writing performs trapeze-artist effects,
generates uncanny feelings or perceptions resembling the miraculous,
transforming the scene of reading in ways that might seem magical
(Plato’s pharmakon never the same again after Derrida, for example,
likewise Rousseau’s ‘supplement’, likewise Freud’s ‘telepathy’, and so
on), if (as Frank Kermode once remarked) Derrida can leave us with a
sense that what he does is beyond the human or that what he requires of
us ‘may not be humanly supportable’, as though indeed Derrida were
not ‘of the same species’ as the rest of us,13 if Derrida does something
with ‘life’, living on and spectrality that is new or unprecedented in
the history of writing (this would be the Derrida that Hélène Cixous
describes as ‘a buried-alive supernatural, who gets wind of a new
definition of immortality through the magic of writing’: he ‘writes as
he posthumes. The writing is his survivor, she [l’écriture, f.] survives
him’),14 and if (as various commentators have observed) Derrida’s
innumerable accounts of the trace, text, supplement, spectre and others
in that long-established ‘non-synonymic chain of substitutions’ can
themselves arouse feelings of wonder or astonishment, all of this must
130 Oxford Literary Review
be tempered in effect by the humility of the ordinary, the miracle as
the ordinary.
2. Lazarus—
—Enough! I can do this just as well or badly as you. I’m doing Number
2. It’s the number of the ghost. Number is the ghost, after all, as
Derrida also suggests.15
2. Lazarus, come forth. That’s what literature is about, according to
Maurice Blanchot. In ‘Literature and the Right to Death’ he writes:
‘Take the trouble to listen to a single word: in that word, nothingness
is struggling and toiling away, it digs tirelessly, doing its utmost to
find a way out, nullifying what encloses it— it is infinite disquiet,
formless and nameless vigilance.’16 Literature, Blanchot suggests, has to
do with the ‘Lazare, veni foras [which] summon[s] the dark, cadaverous
reality from its primordial depths’ (p. 326). At the same time, however,
necessarily placing its hope in ‘the materiality of language, in the fact
that words are things, too’, literature is also ‘a search for this moment
which precedes literature’, it is concerned with ‘the abyss, Lazarus in
the tomb and not Lazarus brought back into the daylight, the one who
already smells bad, who is Evil, Lazarus lost and not Lazarus saved
and brought back to life’ (p. 327). Blanchot’s account of literature
might serve as a sort of cautionary prompt to any quick-fix impulse
simply to characterize literature as the space of miracle: if the literary
work produces resurrectional effects, driven by the passion to let us
hear the ‘infinite disquiet’ of ‘a single word’ (for example, ‘miracle’ or
‘iteration’), it is also what encrypts itself, what wants to bury itself or
be buried, buried alive, before the miracle, before ‘Lazarus saved and
brought back to life’. Blanchot’s figure of Lazarus alerts us to the deep
strangeness of literary language as well as to the complexity of a miracle
motif that runs through all of Shakespeare’s work, namely coming
back or being brought back from the dead: literature as Lazarature.
Jesus wept. He groaned in the spirit. If you were to let me have a
little more time here I would like to elaborate further on the story
of Lazarus, especially in terms of Freud, telepathy and what is called
magical thinking. You see, for me, it starts with that strange sense of
voice and place, that disorienting of what is called narrative voice or
point of view, in the story of Lazarus: ‘Jesus wept. He groaned in the
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spirit.’ In grief at the death of his friend, Jesus ‘groaned in the spirit’.
What is that groan? Can a groan ‘in the spirit’ be heard? Where, whose
or what is this quasi-telepathic voice that apparently knows and tells us
that Jesus groaned in the spirit? At issue here is the great question of
magical thinking in the Bible. If you turn to Freud . . .
— I’m sorry. Not now. Number 3. Hélène Cixous. As I was suggesting,
Jacques Derrida’s writings contain little explicit or sustained reference
to miracles or the miraculous. I know you wanted to quibble about
that, but there is one particular author in relation to whose work he
talks about the miraculous, namely Cixous, above all in his remarkable
bookH.C. for Life, That Is to Say. . . .17 Here the notion of the miracle is,
I think, surprisingly insistent. I will recall just four of the most striking
examples.
The first concerns his discussion of how, quite differently from him,
she ‘writes by dream’ (HCFL, p. 75). Derrida writes, he says, at the
end of the night, ‘when [his] awakening. . . begins by turning off the
current of the phantasm and putting an end to the night’ (p. 76).
Cixous, on the other hand, writes ‘by drawing energy as well as the
figures of her writing from a phantasmoneiric flux that— and this is its
miracle and its magic— is not interrupted by awakening’ (p. 75). This
‘phantasmoneiric flux’ marks out her work, in Derrida’s view, from all
other work, at least from other writing in the twentieth (or twenty-first)
century (see HCFL, pp.12–13). He remarks: ‘I do not know any other
example of such a miraculous alliance between day and night, between
the mad turbulence of the dream and the calculating culture of the
literal and literary realization’ (p. 76). And he adds, as a sort of blinding
proviso to this apprehension of the miraculous, that he ‘believe[s his]
eyes all the less, in front of this miracle’, since he himself ‘work[s] on
the contrary by dream’s interruption’ (p. 76), by the light of day.
The second example has to do with Derrida’s analysis of ‘the mighty
power of the might’ in her writing, the way in which it sings, like a wire
that would be as much a telepathic or telephonic thread as a telegraph
wire, the way it connects what he calls ‘the thought of magic’ with ‘life’
and above all with the imperative ‘Live [vis]’. This ‘might’ has to do
with ‘the magic of what, by a stroke of writing, does the impossible’
(p. 107). Derrida declares:
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the mighty power of the might of which we are speaking, as of
Hélène Cixous’s poetics in fact, is the enchantment, the arrival
as if by an enchantment, where the poetic song, the charm, the
Carmen, and magical power are allied to kommen lassen, make come
in letting come. . . [this is the] formula of the miracle of a chant of
enchantment, which is also a song of songs. (HCFL, p. 79)18
—Ah, the song of songs!—
—Not groaning but singing now, are you? Backing vocal, back on
the song or track of the Bible, let me guess, you’d like to juxtapose,
compare and contrast this miraculous song of ‘making come in letting
come’ (this force of ‘Live’, vis of vis or live-force, this ‘would that you
might live’ [HCFL, p. 77]), with Blanchot’s markedly more sombre
and deathly Lazarus, come forth.
—‘The voice of my beloved! behold, he cometh leaping upon the
mountains, skipping upon the hills. . . ’19
—The third occasion concerning the miraculous in Cixous is where
Derrida speaks of the ‘oceanic mood’ he experiences when confronted
with her writing. It’s like a miraculous catch of fish. He says:
the oceanic mood I feel in front of this work is also reminiscent
of what one feels about a miraculous catch. Magical, miraculous,
and mystical: why? I ask myself why because, as a man of the
Enlightenment, I would still like to give an account and reason
for this miraculous, mystical magic—which must not be an act of
witchcraft. An inexhaustible magic, however.. . . [These] shimmering
fish are not caught by her net. The mighty fish are born from the net
in which they are caught. That is what I call the poetics of the event.
It produces magically, miraculously, and quasi-mystically the very
thing it nominates. It brings about what it catches. (HCFL, p. 97)
Here, perhaps more explicitly than anywhere else in the book,
Derrida insists on this figure of the miraculous while also emphatically
distinguishing it from any sort of witchcraft or supernaturalism. At
issue in Cixous’s work, rather, is a new ‘poetics of the event’ for which
it would be necessary, as he says, to elaborate a new understanding of
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what is meant by ‘magic’, ‘the soul or spirit of animism’, ‘telepathy’,
‘telephony’, ‘phantasm’, ‘omnipotence’ or ‘incantation’ (p. 76).
The final instance is specifically about the instance, the instant or
instantaneity, the bounding miraculous speed of Cixous’s writing, in
particular thanks to substitution. Derrida thus speaks of ‘the infinite
play of substitution of letters that Hélène Cixous’s opus operates, she
who knows how to replace everything, at full speed, including time and
death, by the bond of an immortality’. He goes on:
Substitution is her top game, the power and magic of this writing,
of what happens or takes place, miraculously through the mighty
power of substitution, but of a substitution that leaves the living itself
[vivant singulier] in place. Thus the latter is kept alive or given back
to life through the grace of a bound. At an infinite speed, on the
instant, in a single bound. (HCFL, p. 131)
It is in this context that Derrida speaks about ‘a speed of displacement
in writing’ (p. 73), ‘a speed that, playing with time, outplays time’
(pp. 61–2).
Now I would like to say first of all that with these cases or instances
that Derrida talks about— the ‘miraculous alliance between day and
night’, between ‘dream’ and ‘literal and literary realization’, in short
the ‘phantasmoneiric flux’; the miracle of the chant of enchantment
and ‘the mighty power of the might’; the miraculous catch of the
‘poetics of the event’ which ‘brings about what it catches’; and the
miraculous speed of substitution, a substitutability always affirming
the living singular, living itself [vivant singulier], even as it ‘outplays
time’—with all of this that shimmers up before us in the book H.C.
for Life, That Is to Say. . . , we are given an extraordinary account of the
work of Hélène Cixous, a reading or countersigning of Cixous that is
itself, it seems to me, in its own singular and singularly enlightening
fashion, miraculous. To adapt a formulation suggested a little earlier,
Cixous’s work might never be the same again. At the same time,
however, and indeed in accordance with the mighty powers of literature
and substitution about which Derrida writes and which he reads in her
work and draws on for the energy of his own writing, everything that he
says about the miraculous in Cixous might, with appropriate regard to
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the irreplaceable that is replaced on the spot, be transposed to a reading
of Shakespeare.20
I will try to sketch at least the beginning of such a reading, focusing
on a few appearances of the word ‘miracle’ or ‘miraculous’ itself, in
particular with regard to Henry IV, though I do also want to say
something about Hamlet, before concluding with. . . Are you back
again?
—Yes, I haven’t been anywhere. You’re the one who drifted away.
That’s where we have to begin, I’ve been saying, ‘miracle play’—first
of all perhaps as a sort of hysteron proteron: you have to reckon with the
place of play, play’s displacing, ‘play’ before ‘miracle’, where play—
or at any rate ‘play in a radical way’, as Derrida says—has to do
with a kind of thinking that goes ‘beyond the activity of a subject
manipulating objects according to or against the rules, et cetera.’21
It is a matter of thinking play in ways that are not ‘dominated by
meaning’ or by ‘finality’, play as something no longer simply ‘in the
world’ or the ‘activity’ of someone. As Derrida notes: ‘Philosophy
has always made play into an activity, the activity of a subject
manipulating objects.’22 To miracle play, you have to dream, cast off
into the phantasmoneiric flux, think play anew. It has to do with the
organization and disorganization of dreams and letters. This is one of
the discoveries or conceptual breakthroughs that Derrida attributes to
Freud, thanks to the ‘polycentrism of dream representation’.23 I am
citing his essay ‘Freud and the Scene of Writing’, which focuses on
that tiny but fascinating Freud text ‘Notiz Über den “Wunderblock” ’,
usually referred to in English as ‘A Note Upon The “Mystic Writing-
Pad” ’, though you might like to imagine it as the note on the miracle
pad, the miracle block or miracle book.24 ‘We must be several in order
to write, and even to “perceive” ’ (FSW, p. 226), the mad philosopher
says.25 ‘The sociality of writing as drama requires an entirely different
discipline’ (FSW, p. 227). That’s why drama, and Shakespeare above
all, is so crucial to understanding what deconstruction, if there is any, is
about. Deconstruction is inventive or it is nothing at all, as Derrida has
remarked: invention happens, if it happens, only in multiple voices.26
—OK, that wasn’t what I was saying, but I think I’m with you.
‘Miracle play’: among other things, then, it’s a question of trying
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to read or think backwards, preposterously as Puck would say. (You
recall his words in A Midsummer Night’s Dream: ‘And those things
do best please me / That befall prepos’trously’ [3.2.120–1].) Isn’t
that also what Shakespeare’s plays are, things that work backwards,
animal-machines that see their own futures? It’s the very fabric of
a play like A Midsummer Night’s Dream, but it’s also what makes
the so-called history plays historical, even when they break with the
usual historical account and invent (as in the case of Falstaff or more
accurately perhaps, Falstaff and the other, all the others, a motley
crew of hundreds including Prince Hal, the king in waiting). As the
crazy ‘I’ narrating The Sacred Fount intimates, there’s always something
preposterous about a miracle, in the sense that ‘one’s on the track of the
cause’ as soon as the word ‘miracle’ is in front of you: you’re already
behind.
—Back, as you’ve been saying, back to backing and backtracking
vocals, in a background that’s right in front of us. You have to catch
up. That’s what is always going on with Shakespeare. As Harold Bloom
says: ‘As we read Shakespeare, we are always engaged in catching
up.’27 But let’s recall the initial promise of the title for a moment:
‘a title is always a promise’, as Derrida stresses.28 After all, for all
the preposterousness of ‘play’ preceding or being the scene or staging
of ‘miracle’, surely the phrase ‘miracle play’ will have been taken as
primarily referring to ‘A dramatization based on events in the life of
Jesus or the legends of the saints, popular in the Middle Ages’ (to give
it in the words of the OED)?
—Yes, I imagine that may have led a few people astray, at least
provisionally. And there are of course numerous links between Henry
IV and medieval miracle, mystery or morality plays. There is the
correspondence, for example, between Falstaff and the figure of Vice,
an identification of admittedly limited value, and then there is the
enigmatic place of a certain Nicholas as evoked by Gadshill (see
2.1.59), St Nicholas or Nick, patron saint of children, scholars and
robbers, who in at least one version of a medieval play ‘miraculously
restores to life three slain clerics’.29 But for me it’s a question of a sort of
palaeonymic deployment of the phrase: ‘miracle play’, in other words,
after Derrida. Shakespeare’s writings, all of their poematic theatre,
irreducibly plural, together or alone, instantiate miracle play.
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—In fact, you know, the term ‘miracle play’ does not appear as such
until 1602.30 It is as if anachrony were written into the term. And
there is something funny going on, in any case, already with this
word ‘miracle’ (and its cognates, including the adjective ‘miraculous’),
something to which Shakespeare’s writing bears witness, while also in
singular fashion meddling with it. There is a sort of dehiscence within
the history of the word, where the religious signification sheers off, and
‘miracle’ appears simply as a word for . . .
—Simply? Did you say ‘simply’?
—Yes, the order of the day here is simply ‘simple’. The Oxford
English Dictionary, under the entry for ‘miracle’, starts off with the
quite charming, comical phrase ‘simple uses’. ‘Miracle’, we read:
‘I. Simple uses. 1. a. A marvellous event not ascribable to human
power or the operation of any natural force and therefore attributed
to supernatural, esp. divine, agency; esp. an act (e.g. of healing)
demonstrating control over nature and serving as evidence that the
agent is either divine or divinely favoured.’ The earliest recorded
appearance of the word in this ‘simple’ sense, according to the OED,
is around 1160. Then, under sense 4, there is this other ‘simple use’
of ‘miracle’ (it is difficult, I confess, to refrain from slipping away here
into a revery on this venerable dictionary’s use of ‘use’, at once solemn
and hilarious, the seemingly unmentionable use of ‘use’ as distinct from
‘mention’, the funny time one might have with undoing, precisely in
the spirit of Shakespeare or Cixous, the demented instrumentalism
of the dictionary and of all the institutions correspondingly believed
to function on the basis of such instrumentalism, ‘believed’, what
a word, no place apparently for that here, like a ghost, yes, it is
to come back). ‘Miracle’, ‘simple uses’ number 4: ‘A remarkable,
wonderful, or (in weakened sense) very surprising phenomenon or
event; an achievement or occurrence seemingly beyond human power;
an outstanding achievement.’ Now this sense of ‘miracle’, which crosses
and crosses with the ‘use’ of sense 1a, doubles or iterates it, making it
different from itself, above all in the veering off from the attribution
to ‘supernatural, esp. divine, agency’ towards something less clearly
or explicitly religious, marked by the word ‘seemingly’ (‘seemingly
beyond human power’), this ‘miracle’ (and I will come back to that
phrase, this miracle, it in turn is already a citation or iteration), the
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phenomenon or event of ‘miracle’ in this sense, according to the OED,
dates back to 1586. The dehiscence, the doubling or we might even
say the counterfeiting of ‘miracle’ in this context is also evident in the
use, as they say, of the adjective ‘miraculous’. Traced back to the mid-
fifteenth century, and defined as ‘Of the nature of a miracle; produced
or effected by a miracle; not explicable by natural laws; supernatural’
(sense 1a), ‘miraculous’ is subjected, in the later sixteenth century, to a
discernible shift. It takes on a more ambiguous, less markedly religious
sense, defined in theOED as ‘Resembling a miracle; so extraordinary as
to appear supernatural; remarkable, astonishing’ (sense 2). The earliest
recorded instance of ‘miraculous’ in this sense is Edward Fenton’s
Certaine Secrete Wonders of Nature in 1569: ‘It may seeme miraculous
& almost incredible, that fishes do flye.’ These fish, one might be led
to imagine, fly for more than four hundred years, all the way into the
writings of Cixous and Derrida. More generally, it could be said, what
happens to ‘miracle’ and the ‘miraculous’ in the late sixteenth century
strangely prefigures what is at issue in the emergence of the space of
the ‘uncanny’ (‘uncanny’ as having to do with what resembles or is
seemingly or apparently supernatural) some two hundred years later.
—Don’t get started on the uncanny. We’d be here all night. Stay
focused. As for that shift in the sense of ‘miracle’, Shakespeare, of
course, is onto it, mixed up in it, from the beginning. For one of the
earliest instances of ‘miracle’ in the sense of remarkable, wonderful,
very surprising, seemingly or apparently supernatural, the OED cites
The Merry Wives of Windsor. It is when Falstaff tells Ford, disguised
as Master Brook, about how he ‘suffered the pangs of three several
deaths’, the last of which was ‘to be stopped in like a strong distillation
with stinking clothes that fretted in their own grease’: ‘It was a miracle
to ’scape suffocation’, Falstaff says (see 3.5.86–94). The OED might
just as well, however, or still more appositely have cited the so-
called first part of Henry IV. But let’s stop calling it by this name,
let’s follow Harold Bloom’s suggestion and call it Falstaff’s Wake.31
Either that or Falstaff’s Miracle. The OED, I was saying, could just
as well have cited Falstaff, yes, him again. As if he might lay claim
to some patent on the thing, ‘miracle’ in this sense is Falstaff’s:
‘miracle’ is Falstaffian. So much takes off from him, the one whom
Bloom, in the course of a thirty-five page eulogy, more than once
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calls precisely ‘a miracle’.32 Falstaff, writes Bloom, ‘is a miracle in the
creation of personality’ (p. 313): he is ‘the signature of Shakespeare’s
originality, of his breakthrough into an art more nearly his own’
(p. 278). With Falstaff, as a little later with Hamlet, Shakespeare
creates an unprecedentedly powerful ‘illusion’ (‘if you want to call
it “illusion” ’, says Bloom) of ‘being a real person’. Falstaff, like
Hamlet, is a ‘miracle’ (p. 287). This miracle, for Bloom, has to do
with Shakespeare’s ‘astonishing ability to represent change’ (p. 280):
‘Falstaff, like Hamlet, is always transforming himself, always thinking,
speaking, and overhearing himself in a quicksilver metamorphosis’
(p. 281).
—That’s good, if I may say so, overhearing himself in a quicksilver
metamorphosis. But it’s not just a matter of that, of ‘self-overhearing’
as Bloom calls it.33 There’s the mercurial magic of telepathic writing, a
shivering of voice, irreducible play of voices in the voice, dissemination
of character, vertigo of place, time out of joint.
—Catching up with Shakespeare is about the future as much as the
past. Bloom seems to touch on that when he makes the apparently
straightforward observation: ‘we want to hear what Falstaff will say
next’ (p. 314). He stresses Falstaff’s satirical power, his irrepressible
wit, as well as the sense that (in William Empson’s phrase) ‘Falstaff is
the first major joke by the English against their class system’ (in Bloom,
p. 293). Bloom admiringly recalls A.C. Bradley’s view that the ‘essence
of Falstaff” consists in ‘the bliss of freedom gained in humour’; Falstaff,
says Bradley, ‘lifts us into the atmosphere of perfect freedom’ (cited in
Bloom, pp. 296–7).
— If I can just butt in for a second: at the back of your mind, I
know, you’re feeling strongly tempted to pick up here also on the
characterization of Falstaff as a rogue, and to link it with Derrida’s
discussion of the English and especially Shakespearean senses of the
word ‘rogue’, in Rogues: Two Essays on Reason: Falstaff, in other words,
as rogue state.34 Everything you are in the process of trying to formulate
regarding ‘miracle’ is also evident in that meddling imp of a word,
‘rogue’. It too bears a kind of Falstaffian mark or signature. I imagine
you might start by working backwards from that marvellous four-
word sentence he comes out with in The Merry Wives of Windsor:
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‘Reason, you rogue, reason’ (2.2.12). Derrida cites the OED on ‘rogue’
but, a shade roguishly, neglects to say, chooses to hold back on the
‘playful’ sense, in which ‘rogue’ is ‘a term of endearment’.35 This is
‘rogue’ as ‘One who is of a mischievous disposition’: ‘Common as a
playful term of reproof or reproach, and frequently used as a term
of endearment by 17th century dramatists’ (OED, sense 3). Again,
the word is identified with Falstaff in its first recorded usage in this
sense. The OED quotes Doll Tearsheet in The Second Part of Henry IV
addressing him: ‘Ah, you sweet little rogue, you! . . . Ah, rogue, i’faith,
I love thee’ (2.4.213–16).
—Speak for yourself. For Harold Bloom, as I was saying, Falstaff is
above all ‘a teacher’: he is ‘the Socrates of Eastcheap’ (p. 275): he
‘instructs us in freedom—not a freedom in society, but from society’
(p. 276). This freedom Bloom also characterizes as the miraculous
‘blessing’ which is encapsulated, for him, in the great Falstaffian phrase:
‘more life’ (p. 313). ‘Falstaff teaches us not to moralize’ (p. 297). He is
‘neither immoral nor amoral but of another realm, the order of play’
(p. 298). And this, concludes Bloom, is ‘the essence of Shakespeare’s
dramatic art: the principle of play’ (p. 299).
— I would subscribe to all of that, but would like to complicate and,
I hope, enrich this reading. Bloom’s account is character-based or,
we might say, in a bloated neologism that perhaps does not deserve
to survive beyond the end of this sentence, characterologicocentric.
It is not only a question of Falstaff as ‘a miracle in the creation of
personality’ or as an embodiment of ‘the order of play’, but also of
trying to reckon with a thinking of play that goes beyond the subject,
of play as play of dreams and letters, a sort of polycentric thinking
of the mighty power of the might that might entail, in an instant, at
any instant, a miraculous catch. One way of trying to do this might
be in terms of the play of the word ‘miracle’ itself, of what this little
changeling of a word is doing in Shakespeare’s play. For it seems to me
that it merits another reading, it summons up a strange supplementary
dimension, a third sense to mingle and meddle irrevocably with those
we have so far tracked through the OED. ‘Miracle’, in this other
sense, has to do with a kind of laying on of hands, in particular
the writing hand or hands of Shakespeare, where ‘miracle’ signifies
the very phenomenon of play, the magical shimmery surface-depth of
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drama, in which we, as readers or spectators, know more than Falstaff,
and this on account of the structure of the text, its dramatic irony,
its preposterousness, its exposition of magical thinking, its radical
elaboration of ‘iteration’ and play within and beyond the play. ‘Miracle’
in Shakespeare is always already caught up in the poetic event that is
itself, the net that is (in Derrida’s terms) the nomination of itself.36
—How would the Oxford English Dictionary deal with that?
— I know. It’s a funny thought, isn’t it? To define ‘miracle’, the OED
would need to set out its play within the play or plays of Shakespeare,
‘miracle’ as self-remarking, irreducibly plural scenography that stages,
in the same instant, the very ground of the authority of a definition, of
any and every definition in the dictionary.
—Before coming to the moment in question, then, the place where
Falstaff says (or Shakespeare writes) miracle, we need to track the
context of this ‘iteration’.
—You’re about to nick my idea, I see. Bloom calls it Falstaff’s Wake;
you call it Falstaff’s Miracle; I call it The First Part of Henry IV. In
The First Part of Henry IV Shakespeare seems to me to make a kind
of breakthrough not just with the miraculous ‘creation of personality’,
but with the strange nature of ‘iteration’ as such. The First Part of Henry
IV contains not only the remarkable instance of ‘iteration’ that I know
you’re about to quote, but also the first recorded instance in English
of the word ‘cital’ (5.2.61), meaning ‘citation’ or ‘calling of oneself to
account’, as well as the first recorded instance in English, and the only
instance anywhere in Shakespeare, of the word ‘misquote’ (5.2.13).37
The play is deeply preoccupied with the meddling, comical, magical,
not to mention roguish or indeed devilish strangeness of iteration.
Think of those references to the starling (1.3.223) and the parrot
(2.4.97), Prince Henry’s parroting of ‘Percy’s mind’ (2.4.99-105) and
all of that extended, rather brutal, comical but demented play on the
word ‘anon’ as the Prince and Poins get the tapster Francis to repeat,
over and over: ‘Anon, anon, sir’ (2.4.35ff). I am onto something with
all of this, I am on, I’m sure: anon, anon.
—No, this was my idea in the first place. Anyway the two things
belong together, that’s the point. The breakthrough in creating
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or counterfeiting what Bloom calls ‘a real person’ is indissociably
entwined, entwinned, spinning out of the more narrowly textual or
writerly sort of breakthrough you just evoked concerning the parrot.
—Did I say that?
— ‘Damnable iteration’: that’s a key to Falstaff’s Miracle. It’s one
of the innumerable treasures that the mad philosopher lets you
into: ‘everything is in Shakespeare’, as he says, but also anything in
Shakespeare leads to everything, anything can be a key, starting with
iteration or iterability which of course has already started.38 That is the
ordinary miracle of place. To iterate: that is, ‘to say, mention, or assert
again or repeatedly; to repeat’ (OED, sense 2). Damnable iteration: for
better for worse, there’s always more than one voice in the voice and
no saying where it starts.
— Just ask yourself: What is going on in Shakespeare’s iteration of
Biblical sayings? Who is iterating? Who is it iterated?
— I’m sorry. Did you say rated or iterated?
FALSTAFF [. . . ] An old lord of the Council rated me the other day
in the street about you, sir, but I marked him not; and yet he talked
very wisely, but I regarded him not; and yet he talked wisely, and in
the street too.
PRINCE HENRY Thou didst well, for wisdom cries out in the
streets and no man regards it.
FALSTAFF O, thou hast damnable iteration, and art indeed able to
corrupt a saint. Thou hast done much harm upon me, Hal, God
forgive thee for it. Before I knew thee, Hal, I knew nothing; and
now am I, if a man should speak truly, little better than one of the
wicked. I must give over this life, and I will give it over. By the Lord,
an I do not, I am a villain. I’ll be damned for never a king’s son in
Christendom.
PRINCE HENRY Where shall we take a purse tomorrow, Jack?
(1.2.80–95)
The Bishop’s Bible, not the one he’s later to listen to sitting in the
church at Stratford, with only a little time to go (perhaps in a dream
thinking back to Hotspur near the end of the play, presented with
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some letters to read, sighing ‘I cannot read them now /. . . the time
of life is short’ [5.2.80–1]: as Derrida stresses in that truly crazily
recessive future anterior, life will have been so short39)—but let’s leave
aside the question of iteration between Bibles, rating Bibles iterating
or rating one another— the Bishop’s Bible, the one scholars suppose
Shakespeare is recalling here, at Proverbs 1: 20, reads as follows:
‘Wisdom crieth without, and putteth forth her voice in the streets’;
and verse 24: ‘Because I have called, and ye refused, I have stretched out
my hand, and no man regarded.’40 Where does the iteration begin? Is it
with Hal as he iterates Jack who recalls being rated in the street without
apparently realizing that he is iterating, or in effect being iterated by,
the Bible? Or is it with Jack as he iterates, indulging in that ‘parody of
religious cant’, the ‘tedious and inane repetition’ (as David Bevington
puts it) of homiologia?41 Is there a subject of ‘damnable iteration’? Who
is who here, in these words, and where? ‘Thou hast done much harm
upon me, Hal, God forgive thee for it. Before I knew thee, Hal, I knew
nothing’: supplementing the strange meddling of voice, this apparent
inversion of character and narrative, history and identity (Hal teaching
Jack, rather than vice versa), would participate in the logic of what
you have elsewhere called the ‘iteraphonic’, what you propose as a
‘term without term’ for ‘iterability in the voice’, a kind of magical
thinking in writing that goes ‘faster than time’ (HCFL, p. 63), to
recall a phrase from the mad philosopher. It is a matter of what you
call ‘the meddling imps of words shared, inhabiting and traversing, as
if magically or demonically’.42 Iteration, iterability, iteraphonia: they
jump borders, they move faster than time, not only between one
character and another (without knowledge), or between one scene and
another, but also between one play and another, in the instant of the
poematic.
—OK, I’ll do my damnedest not to repeat myself. Let’s cut and
thrust to Falstaff’s ‘miracle’. He’s recounting what happened to him
after he and three others stole ‘money of the King’s coming down the
hill’ (2.2.50–1), only to have it stolen from them in turn, moments
later, without any fight, by others (in other words by Prince Hal and
Poins who, speeding ahead, back to the tavern in Eastcheap, have been
playing their game of ‘anon’ with the unsuspecting Francis). From one
game of ‘anon’ to another. It is already, then, a play within the play, the
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Prince and Poins in their own little theatre within the theatre, having
played their several parts all the way from London to Kent and back
(see, in particular, 1.2.173ff). This is where we encounter both the
‘rogue’ and the ‘miracle’. The Prince asks him where the ‘thousand
pound’ is.
PRINCE HENRY Where is it, Jack, where is it?
FALSTAFF Where is it? Taken from us it is. A hundred upon poor
four of us.
PRINCE HENRY What, a hundred, man?
FALSTAFF I am a rogue if I were not at half-sword with a dozen
of them two hours together. I have scaped by miracle. I am eight
times thrust through the doublet, four through the hose, my buckler
cut through and through, my sword hacked like a handsaw— ecce
signum! I never dealt better since I was a man. All would not do. A
plague of all cowards! Let them speak. If they speak more or less than
truth, they are villains and the sons of darkness. (2.4.154–65)
Ecce signum! Behold the sign. Falstaff’s iteration of the Catholic
Mass points at once to the singularity of the ‘miracle’ to which it
would purportedly bear witness and into the phantasmoneiric flux of
Shakespeare’s writing, here the dreamy but miraculous displacement
in particular perhaps of hacking into hawking, of Falstaff’s ‘hacked like
a handsaw’ into Hamlet’s claiming to know ‘a hawk from a handsaw’
(Hamlet, 2.2.374), or of ‘ta[king] a thousand pound’ (2.4.153) while
being asked to take Falstaff’s word (else ‘they are villains and the sons
of darkness’) into ‘tak[ing] the ghost’s word for a thousand pound’
(Hamlet, 3.2.270–1). ‘I have scaped by miracle’, says Falstaff: behold
the sign of this sword ‘hacked like a handsaw’. This is a kind of
‘damnable iteration’ of ‘miracle’, a miracle play that meddles with
the sense of ‘miracle’ at once as a ‘marvellous event. . . attributed to
supernatural, esp. divine, agency; esp. an act . . . serving as evidence that
the agent is either divine or divinely favoured’ and as a ‘remarkable,
wonderful, or (in weakened sense) very surprising phenomenon or
event; an achievement or occurrence seemingly beyond human power;
an outstanding achievement.’ For the iteration goes beyond that: the
miracle play of ‘miracle’ here also and above all includes the ecce signum
of the play itself. The ‘miracle’ is self-remarking, already marked as
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play, in a play, counterfeited, in a play within a play. Prince Henry and
Poins know, and we know that they know, that Falstaff’s ‘miracle’ is a
fiction and that it is the effect of that play-within-the-play which Poins
and the Prince have been at once directing and acting in. Falstaff’s
‘miracle’ is always already ironic, preposterous, not his or anyone else’s,
a thing of the play in which the play’s the thing.
— I know why you have been quoting Hamlet apropos this inscribing
of ‘miracle’ in the play and of the play in ‘miracle’, thus of a play over
and beyond any neatly enclosed ‘play within the play’, play no longer
limited by the activities, language or representation of a subject but
caught up already, in advance, in the nets of a kind of telephonic or
telepathic scenario as a new thinking of the ‘poetics of the event’. It is
because of the way, as if by chance, that Hamlet, in soliloquy, draws
on the word ‘miraculous’ (one of only three appearances of this word
in Shakespeare’s work43):
. . . About, my brains. Hum, I have heard
That guilty creatures sitting at a play
Have by the very cunning of the scene
Been struck so to the soul, that presently
They have proclaimed their malefactions;
For murder, though it have no tongue, will speak
With most miraculous organ. I’ll have these players
Play something like the murder of my father
Before mine uncle. (2.2.541–9)
The play within the play in Hamlet is in effect already being specified
here as the ‘miraculous organ’. But of course we only know this on
account of Shakespeare’s dramaturgic consorting with telepathic or
magical thinking, with the form of soliloquy as ‘miraculous organ’
in turn. It is not just self-overhearing (as Harold Bloom has it), it is
a strangely private-public theatre, a sort of interior magic show that
passes show, the exposure or exscription of a character’s otherwise secret
and unknown thoughts and feelings.
— I appreciate that you must feel as if you’ve been doing most of the
talking, but I would like to say something—by way of finishing off—
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about Falstaff’s death, or at any event about Prince Henry’s epitaph
and Falstaff’s—
—Finishing off, who’s talking about finishing off? Cixous remarks and
Derrida recalls: ‘No dead person has ever said their last word.’44 That’s
what makes drama the very counterfeit of life: no one in Shakespeare
has said their last word, least of all Falstaff.
—Yes, this is why Bloom wants to call the play Falstaff’s Wake. He
talks about it as ‘the most joyous representation of secular resurrection
ever staged’ (p. 305). Derrida’s interest in Romeo and Juliet has to do
with what he calls ‘the theatre of the impossible’, with the power of ‘the
simulacrum’ (or the dramatic ‘counterfeit’, we might say) to reveal ‘the
theatre of the impossible’ in which ‘two people each outlive each other’
(AC, p. 422). You have gone on elsewhere about Shakespeare’s (and
Derrida’s) evident fascination with this miracle of double survival, in
particular with regard to what W.H. Auden once called the greatest
love poem in the English language, Antony and Cleopatra. But the
figure of coming back from the dead, miraculous recovery or escape,
is of course everywhere in Shakespeare. It’s not just in Romeo and Juliet
or Antony and Cleopatra or even in those final plays such as Pericles,
Cymbeline and The Winter’s Tale that are specifically designated as
‘miracle plays’, for example, by H.W. Fawkner.45 When ‘Falstaff riseth
up’ (as the stage direction puts it: see 5.4.109), it is doubtless a
parody of that coming back from the dead that is characteristic of
medieval miracle plays, the sort of parody that is subject to attack
in the celebrated Lollard polemic ‘A Tretis of Miraclis Pleyinge’, an
attack doubtless impelled by what T.G. Bishop calls ‘fear of blurred
boundaries between authoritative and parasitic signs’.46 But it is also
immeasurably more and other than this. As Bishop observes:
Shakespeare’s poetry does what medieval drama always threatened
to do, what Aquinas indicated was always implied by the logic of
a sacramental semiosis: it unbinds itself and its shaping power from
the Church. At the heart of Shakespeare’s drama is a power confident
that words can incarnate lives before the eyes of an audience
without the institutional apparatus of the Church to guarantee
their orthodoxy, and without a structure of dogma external to the
dramatic occasion.47
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What Shakespeare spirits up in Henry IV is a new kind of ‘scaping by
miracle’, a new writing of miracle play.
—Why don’t you try to read this final passage then? Prince Henry
addresses the dead Hotspur, whom he has slain, then notices ‘poor
Jack’. You can be the Prince, I’ll be Falstaff.
PRINCE HENRY
Thy ignominy sleep with thee in the grave,
But not remembered in thy epitaph!
He spieth Falstaff on the ground
What, old acquaintance, could not all this flesh
Keep in a little life? Poor Jack, farewell!
I could have better spared a better man.
O, I should have a heavy miss of thee
If I were much in love with vanity.
Death hath not struck so fat a deer today,
Though many dearer, in this bloody fray.
Embowelled will I see thee by and by.
Till then, in blood by noble Percy lie. Exit
Falstaff riseth up
FALSTAFF
Embowelled! If thou embowel me today, I’ll give you leave to powder
me and eat me too tomorrow. ’Sblood, ’twas time to counterfeit, or
that hot termagant Scot had paid me, scot and lot too. Counterfeit?
I lie, I am no counterfeit. To die is to be a counterfeit, for he is
but the counterfeit of a man who hath not the life of a man; but to
counterfeit dying, when a man thereby liveth, is to be no counterfeit,
but the true and perfect image of life indeed. The better part of
valour is discretion, in the which better part I have saved my life.
(5.4.99–119)
—So much for dear friends. It’s all about the strangeness of
soliloquy—
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—I beg your pardon?
— I said the strangeness of soliloquy—
—In which Falstaff apparently returns from the dead (as Prince Henry
says, in astonishment, on seeing him again a few lines later: ‘Art thou
alive? / Or is it fantasy that plays upon our eyesight?’ [5.4.131–2]).
This speech (as if by ‘miraculous organ’), witnessed by no one in the
play, also plays on the fantasy of our eyesight, on a phantasmoneiric
fiction that we are not witnesses ourselves (‘Nothing confutes me but
eyes and nobody sees me’, as Falstaff goes on to say [5.4.124–5]). It
veers at such incredible speed and in so many directions at once. Try
to track and read, for example, the weird repetition of ‘counterfeit’
here, a word that appears repeatedly in reference to the king, just a
little earlier (5.4.27, 34), but when Falstaff is not present, and that
at the same prefigures the counterfeit ‘death’ of Henry IV in the so-
called second part of Henry IV. Or try to trace the iteraphonic force
of ‘life’ here (recall Falstaff’s great motto: ‘Give me life’ [5.3.59]), ‘life’
injecting itself after life, all the way up to and into the collected writings
of Hélène Cixous. Or think on how this ‘wake’ is hauntingly inscribed
in the ‘[scape] by miracle’ encountered earlier. It is what everything in
the play will have been leading up to. Preposterous and magical, this is
miracle strangely deferred, miracle iterated, miracle iterable. Tableau.
[Exit]
—Hang on. Where did you go? There was something else I had
to say. A brief epilogue, that’s all. But you’re gone. How did that
happen? You’re impossible. No one now but me . . . Talk about bad
timing . . . You mentioned Antony and Cleopatra as a love poem. Cixous
also speaks of it, I seem to remember, as a miracle. Yes: the ‘miracle’
of Antony and Cleopatra, she says, ‘is to have captured death at last, to
have appropriated the enemy, to have put death into their enchanted
bed . . . to have substituted forever for the unlivable absence an absolute
embrace.’48 And then in ‘Aphorism Countertime’, when Derrida speaks
about the theatre of the impossible telling the truth, it has to do
with love, with the way in which any two lovers pledge to keep the
other, interiorize the other, beyond death. As he remarks: ‘This double
interiorization would be possible neither in monadic interiority nor in
the logic of “objective” time and space. It takes place nevertheless every
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time I love’ (AC, p. 422). It makes me think of that line near the end
of The Taming of the Shrew: ‘Love wrought these miracles’ (5.1.112).
And then there is a certain sonnet, which links love, the name of love,
the act of nomination, with the miracle of writing, ‘this miracle’. This
is the might of miracle play, as if it had already dreamt while dreaming
itself up for ‘the mighty power of the might’ of which Derrida writes
and which he finds in Cixous:
Since brass, nor stone, nor earth, nor boundless sea,
But sad mortality o’ersways their power,
How with this rage shall beauty hold a plea,
Whose action is no stronger than a flower?
O how shall summer’s honey breath hold out
Against the wrackful siege of batt’ring days,
When rocks impregnable are not so stout,
Nor gates of steel so strong but time decays?
O fearful meditation; where, alack,
Shall time’s best jewel from time’s chest lie hid?
Or what strong hand can hold his swift foot back?
Or who his spoil or beauty can forbid?
O none, unless this miracle have might
That in black ink my love may still shine bright.49
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